The New Generation Society

Tom Daltas

Tom Daltas is a PPE student at York University. He uses Turkey’s EU bid as an example of how incautious expansion based on idealism alone is not a step towards a more powerful and integrated Europe for the New Generation.

Whilst the EU works towards greater harmony amongst its current members, elsewhere its enlargement continues at an incautious pace. Central to this enlargement is Turkey’s bid for membership, which will prove pivotal in defining the real future of the EU. It is this future that the New Generation must focus on.

In theory so long as the Copenhagen Criteria (the economic, democratic prerequisites for EU membership) are satisfied, any candidate within the European neighbourhood should be welcome. Considering its government’s progress towards meeting these criteria in recent years, Turkey’s case is gaining credibility. For example Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pushed through key democratic reforms that have increased rights to freedom of expression, increased rights to the Kurdish minority and restricted the military’s involvement in politics.

But scratch the surface and all is not well. Despite international pressure Ankara has yet to tackle significant obstacles to the nation’s continued political reform whose resolution would necessitate embarrassing u-turns in foreign policy. Turkey has so far recognised neither the Ottoman-led Armenian genocide of 1915, which resulted in the death of 1.7 million Armenians, nor the nation status of Cyprus, the northern half of which Turkey invaded and occupied in 1974.

Debate between Turkey and the EU has raged on these issues for decades yet as EU requirements remain unaltered in the face of Turkish prevarication, either Ankara must make concessions or forfeit its claim to the membership it has sought for 44 years. Exemplifying this state of affairs was Ankara’s refusal last year to grant special trade rights to Cyprus, incurring a heavy penalty to EU negotiations. All the same, Ankara has stated its intention to satisfy all requirements for full membership by 2014.

On the whole European popular opinion is set against Turkey’s EU bid. A 2005 survey revealed that 52% of Europeans were against and only 35% for. In some regions of Europe, feeling on the issue can be intense. Championing opposition to Turkey’s accession were Austria (80%), Germany (74%), Luxembourg (72%), France (70%) and Greece (70%). Hungary and the UK were by far the most favourable at a comparatively low 51% and 45% against respectively.

But it is an arguable point that this popular resistance stems from the collective insecurities of Europe’s citizens and some medieval fear of the ‘Turk’ and is therefore something our leaders rightly seek to overcome. It is a source of considerable popular consternation that Turkey is just too different. After all, Turkey lies outside the conventional boundaries of Europe and its people are seen as culturally further away than the mere distance separating Ankara from Brussels: over 90% of the Turkish population is Muslim, 20% of the population live in poverty and to a large extent the shared culture between Europe and Turkey through history has been that of war. But should not such an exceptional past inspire the EU to diversify by granting Turkey membership and thus raise the standard of democracy there?

The political value of a ‘European’ Turkey would be enormous at a time when we are seeing signs of the widespread international alienation of Islam. Turkey’s membership would dispel any conception of the EU as an all-Christian club and would enhance its powers of persuasion greatly. Hypothetically, if in the next decade the EU is extended to share borders with Iraq and Iran, its diplomatic power could achieve great things in those regions.

The delicacy of the Turkish negotiations is obvious. The EU must successfully employ both carrot and stick in order to push through democratic reform in Turkey. Too strict an approach would go down badly with a nation so loath to lose face and the loss of Turkey’s direct involvement in European politics would be a dire blow to the EU’s future, while too lax an approach makes the Union as a whole seem weak.

Popular opinion is the all-important factor. Whilst slightly higher migration levels than normal are already causing tension within current EU states and unrest amongst ethnic minorities in Europe has made the headlines in recent years, the prospect of Turkey’s accession causes justifiable concern. Turkey’s population is currently growing by 1 million a year, a rate that would class it the Union’s largest country, ahead of Germany, by 2015. Whilst this burgeoning population, given the right to work anywhere within the EU, could be beneficial and counter the effects of an ageing European population, the rate of demographic change could become uncontrollable in certain regions.

There is also cause for concern with the quality of the Copenhagen Criteria themselves. For although in principle they provide a good measure of a country’s democratic standards, they do not necessarily ensure that between two nations, both deemed suitable for EU membership, the quality of their legal systems, say, is equal. It must be wondered whether in the rush to satisfy EU standards the Turkish government is focusing on doing just that and is achieving only superficial reform without making provision for the cultural changes that ultimately underpin genuine reform.

A case in point is that of Orhan Pamuk, the Turkish novelist and Nobel Prize-winner, who was prosecuted in 2005 under the newly-introduced Article 301 for “insulting Turkishness” as he had made public his belief that his country was responsible for the Armenian Genocide. Charges were quickly dropped and Article 301 was amended following EU rumblings but the case highlights the inconsistent Turkish attitude towards such fundamental rights as free speech. Given that should Turkey accede it will have the strongest presence in European Parliament since states are allocated seats by population size, it is mildly worrying that such a democratically immature power will immediately play such a central role in EU politics.

The overall impression is that the EU is rushing things. It is of course understandable why: Turkey’s full membership will not come a moment too soon with regards to the EU’s future in foreign policy. But the truth remains that significant changes in Turkey are being rushed through and will not be given the years needed to mature and take real effect throughout all political and social echelons. A transitional state will be ushered into the fold when it would be far safer to postpone negotiations to a later date and thus avoid having to rely on the EU’s uncertain capacity to absorb and diversity.

Either way, the verdict on Turkey’s bid will be a key moment for the EU. If membership is granted the act will signal an expansion of the EU’s political capabilities and ambitions and a decisive step will have been taken. However, guided by idealism alone, the current EU will be ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of integrating and cooperating with the Turkish government and people and so the future might see a slump in Europe’s competence. Talks will reopen next month when the European Commission publishes its report on the progress of negotiations. I await its findings with baited breath.